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**Nineteenth Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS**

(This report covers the week from  
22 June through 28 June 1973)

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense*

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29 June 1973

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DIA review completed

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29 June 1973

Nineteenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF  
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
22 June through 28 June 1973)

The Key Points

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- North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos is now nearly at a standstill, although heavy NVA logistic traffic continues in northern South Vietnam and moderate activity continues in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
- Combat activity was at a low level in South Vietnam. It was also low in most areas of Laos, except around Thakhek where Communist forces launched several battalion-size attacks over a four day period.

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
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The Details

NOTE: This is the nineteenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

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B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies  
Through and Into Laos and South Vietnam

5. North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos is now nearly at a standstill, although construction work continues on selected sections of the road network. In northern South Vietnam resupply traffic continued at a heavy pace during the week

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[REDACTED] Heavy vehicle activity was observed throughout the area, particularly in the supply corridor extending from the DMZ to the A Shau Valley. Logistic activity in southern North Vietnam also continued to be moderately heavy, with some of the resupply movements being directed toward northern Laos.

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6. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam


probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

- a.) Recent evidence indicates that by the end of June the North Vietnamese will probably have completed construction of a petroleum storage and receiving facility capable of storing almost 300 metric tons of POL at a location 10 miles northwest of Quang Tri City. The new facility is at the terminus of the four-inch-diameter military pipeline constructed across the DMZ from North Vietnam in April 1972. The NVA has also been strengthening its POL resupply system in other areas of northern MR 1 in recent months.

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- b.) On 21 June, 88 cargo vehicles were detected on Route 548 north of A Shau (42 northbound, 13 southbound, 33 parked.)
- c.) On 23 June, 68 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the route's junction with Route 6088 (8 eastbound, 23 westbound, 37 parked.)
- d.) On 23 June, 11 cargo vehicles were parked on a feeder route running north from Route 9 west of Dong Ha.
- e.) On 24 June, 150 cargo vehicles were observed along Route 548 north of A Shau (59 northbound, 29 southbound, 62 parked.)
- f.) On 26 June, 64 cargo trucks were on Route 9 between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the intersection with



Route 6088 (16 eastbound, 14 westbound, 34 parked.) On the same date, 12 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh (1 northbound, 2 southbound, 9 parked.)

7. During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent suggests that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.

a.) The table below lists observed NVA vehicle activity on selected routes in the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period.\*

<u>Date</u>	<u>Route 99</u>	<u>Route 9211</u>	<u>Route 958</u>
21 June	0	NC	0
22 June	NC	NC	NC
23 June	NC	NC	NC
24 June	NC	NC	NC
25 June	NC	NC	NC
26 June	2(1-N)	0	NC
27 June	2(1-N,1-S)	0	NC

\* The first number in each entry is the total number of vehicles. Of these totals, the number of trucks moving north (N) or south (S) are noted in the parentheses after each total. The remainder of the vehicles detected were parked along the roadway. "NC" indicates no coverage.

b.) Construction and repair activity was observed at numerous points on the



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road network in the Laos Panhandle as the North Vietnamese continue their efforts to upgrade the logistic system there. As of 27 June, an estimated 50 miles of this work are currently in progress, the distance comprising a number of segments over the length of the Panhandle. The activity consists primarily of widening, straightening and upgrading the drainage capabilities of existing roads.

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c.)

8. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies probably destined for South Vietnam and northern and southern Laos.

a.)

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b.)

c.) On [ ] June, 36 northbound and 65 southbound cargo vehicles were observed crossing a ferry on the Troc River near Quang Khe. On [ ] June, 84 vehicles crossed at the same point; however, their direction of movement could not be determined.

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d.)

e.)

C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces  
in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

9. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January and for the last week (22-28 June) are shown below:

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>Total Since Ceasefire Level of Action</u>		<u>Last Week (22-28 June) Level of Action</u>	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	1,056	3,506	6	53
MR 2	284	2,033	6	107
MR 3	419	2,762	10	70
MR 4	733	6,665	15	180
Totals	2,492	14,966	37(86) <u>1/</u>	410(601) <u>1/</u>

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.


10. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular



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# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



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time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the ceasefire.

11. The following is a chronological listing of only the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week.

MILITARY REGION 1

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 2

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 3

a.) No significant activity.

MILITARY REGION 4

a.) On 23 June, an ARVN unit 10 miles south of Vi Thanh received a ground attack.

b.) On 25 June, eight miles southeast of Rach Gia and 12 miles east of Vi Thanh, ARVN forces received ground attacks.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Week from 22 through 28 June 1973

12. Except for intensified activity in Lao Military Region 3 (the central Panhandle), Communist-initiated combat remained at a low level. In MR 3, however, Communist units near Thakhek carried out a series of attacks between 23 and 26 June against government troops in the area. Several of the attacks were of battalion-size, and resulted in the withdrawal of some company-size units of the government side a few kilometers from previously held positions.

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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## ANNEX III

Development of NVA Petroleum Resupply Facilities  
in Northern South Vietnam

1. North Vietnam's capacity to supply POL to northern South Vietnam has been appreciably upgraded since the 27 January signing of the Vietnam settlement agreement. The reliability and efficiency of the NVA's pipeline system in the area has been improved, and temporary storage facilities have been replaced with permanent depots.

2. Communist forces in northern MR 1 receive most of their POL from North Vietnam [redacted] pipeline constructed through the DMZ in April 1972. NVA forces in the A Shau Valley, however, have been supplied by a branch pipeline extending eastward from the main North Vietnam-Laos pipeline, and another branch pipeline has also been built--apparently since 27 January--from the Chavane area of southern Laos eastward into South Vietnam. In addition to the POL storage facility northwest of Quang Tri City (discussed in Paragraph 6(a) of this report), two additional POL installations, one near Khe Sanh and the other in the A Shau Valley, are under construction or have been recently completed. A truck refueling depot with a capacity of about 20 metric tons has been completed adjacent to Route 9, two miles south of Khe Sanh airfield. The Communists will probably extend a spur-pipeline into this area from their main pipeline in Laos or from the line which crosses the DMZ to the east. In the A Shau Valley, a 200 metric ton storage facility is now under construction near Route 548. The construction of such permanent facilities is additional evidence that the North Vietnamese Army intends to remain in these areas indefinitely.

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